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In optical implementations of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol, the bit information is usually
encoded in the phase of two consecutive photon pulses generated in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
In the actual experimental realization, the loss in the arms of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer is
not balanced, for example because only one arm contains a lossy phase modulator. Therefore, the
amplitudes of the pulses is not balanced, and the structure of the signals and measurements no
longer corresponds to the (balanced) ideal BB84 protocol. Hence, the BB84 security analysis no
longer applies in this scenario. We provide a security proof of the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84.
The resulting key rate turns out to be lower than the key rate of the ideal BB84 protocol. Therefore,
in order to guarantee security, the loss due to the phase modulator cannot be ignored.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex, 42.79.Sz
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a way for
two distant parties (Alice and Bob) to establish a shared
secret key with absolute confidentiality. Many protocols
[1] have been suggested to achieve this goal, among which
the BB84 protocol [2] is the most well-known example. In
the BB84 protocol, Alice randomly chooses between two
conjugate bases of a qubit Hilbert space, and encodes the
bit value of the key elements in the basis states. She sends
these states to Bob through a quantum channel, who
measures them randomly in one of the conjugate bases.
After having collected enough data, they perform error
correction to eliminate the errors in their data, followed
by privacy amplification to guarantee the security of the
generated key from an eavesdropper (Eve).
In optical implementations, the bit information is usu-
ally encoded in a photonic degree of freedom, e.g., in the
polarization of photons, or the phase of two consecutive
photon pulses. In the phase-encoded protocol, the phase
between two consecutive pulses prepared by Alice deter-
mine the bit and the basis value of the sent signal. In
the actual experimental realization of the phase-encoded
BB84 protocol with Mach-Zehnder interferometers (see
Fig. 1), the phase modulator, which is in one arm of
the interferometer, introduces loss. While this does not
change the observed error rate in the data, it changes
the signal states and the measurements of the protocol.
Since this is now a different protocol, the security proofs
tailored to the BB84 protocol no longer apply in this
scenario.
In this work, we provide a security proof of the phase-
encoded BB84 where we take into account the loss in
the phase modulator (“unbalanced phase-encoded proto-
col”). We use the security approach presented in Refs.
[3, 4] to calculate the key rate. This security approach
is valid when Eve is restricted to collective attacks, but
in many situations, it also holds for the more general
∗aferenczi@iqc.ca
coherent attacks.
We provide a qubit-based security proof, that is later
extend to optical modes. At the source side, we extend
the validity of the qubit-based security proof to optical
modes using the tagging approach introduced in Refs. [5,
6] in the decoy framework [7–9]. On the other hand, the
squashing model in Refs. [10–12] justifies the assumption
of a qubit-based security proof at the receiver’s side.
I. PROTOCOL SETUP AND PROOF
TECHNIQUES
A. Unbalanced phase-encoded protocol
A scheme of the protocol setup is provided in Fig. 1.
Alice sends photon pulses through a Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer with a long arm and a short arm, to create
the signal states. In the long arm, Alice changes the rel-
ative phase ϕx of the two pulses with a phase modulator
to imprint the basis and the bit information on the sig-
nal. Alice chooses the phases ϕx =
pi
2x for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
with equal probability for the 4 signal states. The phases
ϕx ∈ {0, pi} and ϕx ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2} correspond to the
bit values {0, 1} in the “even” and “odd” basis. Like-
wise, the receiver (Bob) detects the signals by means of
a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Bob chooses the phase
ϕB ∈ {0, pi/2}, which determines the basis (“even” or
“odd”) of his measurement. Bob chooses each measure-
ment setting with probability 1/2.
The pulses arrive in Bob’s detectors in three different
time slots, either in the top output port (slots c1, c2 and
c3 in Fig. 1) or in the bottom output port (slots d1, d2
and d3 in Fig. 1). Only the middle clicks (slots c2 and
d2) are used for the key generation. The outside clicks
(slots c1, c3, d1 and d3) are pulses that did not interfere
at Bob’s second beam splitter. If the signal produces
interference (e.g. the detectors click in the middle time
slot), then Bob determines the bit value of the incoming
signal based on his phase setting.
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FIG. 1: Alice and Bob use a Mach-Zehnder interferometer to prepare and detect the signal pulses. Only the interfering pulses,
which produce clicks in the time slots c2 and d2 (black-red and red-black overlapping pulses) are used for the key generation.
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FIG. 2: A variation of the protocol with the pulses encoded
in different polarization. Bob places a polarizing beam split-
ter (PBS) at the entrance of his interferometer, and rotates
the polarization in one arm of the interferometer, for exam-
ple by using a half wave plate (HWP) to cause the desired
interference.
To obtain the data for the key generation, Alice and
Bob apply a sifting step, in which they announce to each
signal the basis (“even” or “odd”) publicly and discard
all data points where the basis did not match.
The lossy phase modulator typically introduces a loss
in one of the arms of the interferometer, producing pulses
with different amplitudes. We model the lossy phase
modulator by a perfect (lossless) phase modulator fol-
lowed by a beamsplitter with transmissivity κ ≤ 1 that
simulates the loss.
B. PBS protocol
As a slight variation of the protocol, consider Alice en-
coding her outgoing pulses in different polarization, and
Bob replacing his first beamsplitter by a polarizing beam-
splitter (see Fig. 2). This causes the two pulses to arrive
simultaneously at Bob’s second (interfering) beamsplit-
ter. If he also rotates the polarization of the signal in
one arm, all signals will interfere. We analyze the secu-
rity proof of this protocol as well. Throughout the paper
we will call this protocol the PBS protocol.
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FIG. 3: a) Original picture of the unbalanced phase-encoded
protocol with the loss in Bob’s interferometer. b) Equivalent
lossless interferometer picture with a loss 1/(2ξ) in the chan-
nel followed by lossless interferometer with an uneven beam
splitter with transmissivity ξ.
C. Proof techniques
Typically, we assume that the eavesdropper (Eve) in-
tercepts the quantum channel between Alice and Bob
with the goal to learn about the key. Eve can tamper
with the signals at will, but her interaction will introduce
some disturbance to the signals, which can be detected
by Alice and Bob.
It is generally difficult to provide a security proof for
a scenario with a lossy measurement. Therefore, we con-
struct a picture where a lossy beamsplitter with trans-
missivity 12ξ is placed into the quantum channel followed
by a lossless interferometer with an uneven first beam-
splitter with transmissivity
ξ =
1
1 + κ
. (1)
This “lossless interferometer” picture is equivalent to the
original picture with the lossy phase modulator in the
long arm of the interferometer, as it yields the same mea-
surement outcomes. The two pictures are shown in Fig.
3. However, in the lossless interferometer picture we can
deal with the loss (that has now been outsourced to the
channel) by giving Eve control over it and treat it like
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FIG. 4: a) Hardware fix with the same amount of loss intro-
duced in the short arm of the interferometer to compensate
for the loss due to the phase modulator. b) Equivalent lossless
interferometer picture.
a) b)
Uneven beam splitter
κ
Equivalent picture
2(1− ξ)1− ξ
Thursday, May 17, 2012
FIG. 5: Hardware fix with a biased beamsplitter in the
interferometer to compensate for the loss due to the phase
modulator. b) Equivalent lossless interferometer picture.
regular channel loss in the security proof.
In the case of the PBS protocol, we allot the control
over the polarizing beam splitter and the lossy beamsplit-
ter with transmissivity κ in the long arm to Eve, leaving
Bob with a lossless detector.
II. HARDWARE FIX
One simple way to recover the original BB84 scenario
is by manually introducing a beamsplitter with the same
transmissivity κ in the shorter arm of the interferometers
to compensate for the loss due to the phase modulator.
Alternatively, one can replace the first beamsplitter in
the interferometer by a biased beamsplitter with trans-
missivity 1−ξ. A schematic of these alternatives is shown
in Figs. 4 and 5.
The BB84 signal states and measurements are recov-
ered in the equivalent lossless interferometer pictures,
which are shown in Figs. 4 and 5 for the two hardware
fix possibilities. Under the assumption that the loss is at-
tributed to Eve, the security proof reduces to the known
BB84 security proof.
III. SINGLE PHOTON CONTRIBUTION
In the following, we study the case where Alice sends a
single photon and Bob obtains a single photon (qubit-to-
qubit scenario). We analyze the signal structure and the
measurements of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol
and the PBS protocol and provide a security proof (qubit
security proof). Later, in section X, we embed the qubit
security proof into the more realistic scenario with optical
modes in infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces using decoy
states [8], tagging [5, 6] and squashing [10–12].
A. Alice’s signal states
If a single photon is distributed over the two time
modes (pulses) emerging from Alice, the resulting Hilbert
space of the signal states (HS) is a qubit space. We de-
note the creation operators of the two time modes by
a†0 and a
†
1, and define the two canonical basis vectors
|0〉 = a†0|vac〉 and |1〉 = a†1|vac〉 of HS . After Alice im-
printed her phase choice onto the pulses, the signal leav-
ing her apparatus can be in either of the four possible
states
|ϕx〉 =
√
ξ|0〉+
√
1− ξeipix/2|1〉. (2)
for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The relationship between ξ and κ
was already defined in Eq. (1). In Fig. 6 we show a
representation of the signal state on the Bloch sphere in
comparison to the signal states of the BB84 protocol.
Alice then sends the signal states with equal proba-
bility through a quantum channel to Bob. This scheme
is called prepare-and-measure scheme. Alternatively, the
distribution of the signal states is captured in the source-
replacement scheme: Alice constructs a (hypothetical)
entangled state |Φ〉 ∈ HAS in her lab, and sends the sec-
ond system (S) to Bob. By means of a positive operator
valued measure (POVM) Alice performs a measurement
on the system A, which effectively prepares the signal
states on the system S for Bob. Furthermore, the re-
duced density matrix ρA = trS(|Φ〉〈Φ|) is fixed in the
source-replacement scheme. In our case, the entangled
source state is |Φ〉AS =
√
ξ|00〉 + √1− ξ|11〉 with a re-
duced density matrix
ρA = ξ|0〉〈0|+ (1− ξ)|1〉〈1|. (3)
Alice’s POVM elements on HA are then essentially BB84
measurements
Ax =
1
2
P
[ |0〉+ e−ipix/2|1〉√
2
]
. (4)
for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. We denote by P [|α〉] = |α〉〈α| a
projector.
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FIG. 6: Comparison of the qubit signal states on the Bloch
sphere. a) The signal states of the BB84 protocol, b) the
signal states of the protocol with a lossy phase modulator.
B. Bob’s detection in the unbalanced
phase-encoded protocol
The modes a†0 and a
†
1 arrive at Bob’s detector after
Eve interacted with the signals. The output of Bob’s de-
tectors carry 6 modes in total, 2 in each of the 3 time
slots. We denote the modes of the top (bottom) detec-
tor by c†i (d
†
i ) for i = 1, 2, 3, respectively. For a fixed
phase ϕB ∈ {0, pi/2}, the transformation of the a†i to
the modes in the top and bottom detectors yield (up to
global phases):
c†1 =
1√
2
√
ξa†0,
c†2 =
1√
2
(
√
1− ξa†0 + eiϕB
√
ξa†1),
c†3 =
1√
2
√
1− ξa†1,
d†1 =
1√
2
√
ξa†0,
d†2 =
1√
2
(
√
1− ξa†0 − eiϕB
√
ξa†1),
d†3 =
1√
2
√
1− ξa†1.
We choose to combine several outputs into one POVM el-
ement of Bob’s measurement (coarse-graining). In terms
of the incoming modes |0〉 and |1〉, Bob’s POVM elements
are
By =
1
4
P [
√
1− ξ|0〉+
√
ξeipiy/2|1〉)],
Bout = ξ|0〉〈0|+ (1− ξ)|1〉〈1|, (5)
where for y runs over {0, 1, 2, 3}. The 4 POVM elements
By correspond to inside clicks (time slot 2) in the two
bases, while Bout denotes the POVM element of the out-
side clicks (time slots 1 and 3).
C. Bob’s detection in the PBS protocol
In a similar manner, the modes in the output ports of
Bob’s interferometer in the PBS protocol are found to be
c† =
1√
2
(e−iϕBa†0 − ia†1),
d† =
1√
2
(−ie−iϕBa†0 + a†1).
There are only two output modes, since there are no out-
side clicks in this protocol. Bob’s corresponding POVM
on the input system has 4 elements for y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
B′y =
1
2
P
[
(|0〉+ eipiy/2|1〉√
2
]
, (6)
which is essentially a BB84 measurements.
Indeed, in the PBS scenario, both Alice’s and Bob’s
measurements are BB84 measurements. The difference
between the PBS protocol and the BB84 protocol, how-
ever, is found in the reduced density matrix ρA, which
contains the information about the modified signal struc-
ture as shown in Fig. 6.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTIMAL
ATTACK
Eve’s interaction with the signals typically introduces
some disturbance to the source state |Φ〉. The actual
state that Alice and Bob share after Eve’s interaction is a
general unknown (mixed) state ρAB . The only knowledge
Alice and Bob hold about ρAB is concentrated in the
probability distribution
p(x, y) = tr{Ax ⊗By ρAB} (7)
of their measurement outcomes with respect to the
POVMs MA = {Ax} and MB = {By}. These proba-
bilities are determined during the step of parameter es-
timation. Additionally, they also know that Alice’s re-
duced density matrix ρA = trB(ρAB) is fixed, because it
never entered Eve’s domain. Consequently, they hold a
parametrization of the set of all possible density opera-
tors ρAB that are compatible with p(x, y) and ρA, which
we define in the following by Γ:
Definition 1 The set Γ contains all bipartite states ρAB
that have a given reduced state ρA and are compatible
with the measurement outcomes p(x, y).
In the source-replacement scheme Eve’s attack is de-
scribe by the purification |Ψ〉ABE of ρAB . The purifica-
tion lives on a dilated space HABE , where the dimension
of the purifying system E is the same as the dimension
of AB. Giving Eve full control over |Ψ〉ABE , allows her
to exploit everything allowed by quantum mechanics for
her attack.
5V. KEY RATE FORMALISM
Along the lines of Ref. [13], we derive the key rate
that Alice and Bob can extract from a state |Ψ〉 using
postselection, such as basis sifting.
A. Key rate formula
Given Alice, Bob and Eve share the state |Ψ〉. Af-
ter the measurement with respect to the POVMs MA =
{Ax} and MB = {By}, the three parties share a classical-
classical-quantum (ccq) state [3]
ρXYE =
∑
x,y∈M
p(x, y)|x, y〉〈x, y| ⊗ ρxyE . (8)
The probability p(x, y) was already defined in Eq. (7),
whereas Eve’s conditional states are given by ρxyE =
trAB{Ax ⊗ By ⊗ 1E |Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x, y). According to Refs.
[3, 4], the key rate that can be extracted from such a
state is
r(ρXYE) = I(X : Y )− χ(X : E), (9)
where I(X : Y ) = H(X) + H(Y )−H(X,Y ) is the clas-
sical mutual information between Alice and Bob’s data
p(x, y), and χ(X : E) = H(X) + S(E) − S(X,E) is the
Holevo quantity between Alice and Eve. H and S denote
the Shannon entropy and the von Neumann entropy, re-
spectively. If ρAB is known, the Holevo quantity can
be expressed in terms of Eve’s states ρxE conditioned on
Alice’s value x and her reduced state ρE =
∑
x p(x)ρ
x
E
χ(X : E) = S(ρE)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxE). (10)
If Alice’s POVM elements are rank-one projectors, an
explicit reference in the Holevo quantity to the system
E can be eliminated. It can be expressed in terms of
quantities on the systems AB only:
χ(X : E) = S(ρAB)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxB). (11)
B. Key rate formula with postselection
First we introduce the same notation as in Ref. [13]
with emphasis on the dependence of the key rate on ρAB
and the corresponding measurement, rather than the ex-
plicit ccq state ρXYE . In the new notation we denote the
Holevo quantity by
χ(ρAB ,MA) := χ(X : E). (12)
In the classical description of the postselection, Alice
and Bob make an announcement to each measurement
outcome to filter out uncorrelated data. Alice announces
the basis of her outcome (“even” or “odd”), and Bob an-
nounces the basis of his outcome (“even” or “odd”) if it
was an inside click. If it was an outside click, he and an-
nounces “out”. These announcements do not reveal the
bit values. Based on the announcements, they keep the
events where both announced “even” or both announced
“odd”, and discard the rest. We denote the events where
they had the same announcement by u = “even” or u =
“odd”. The identification of the announcements effec-
tively defines the subsets mevenA = {A0, A2}, moddA =
{A1, A3}, mevenB = {B0, B2} and moddB = {B1, B3} of
the POVMs MA and MB , which contain the POVM el-
ements corresponding to the announcement u = “even”
or u = “odd”.
The quantum version of the postselection is described
by a two-step process on ρAB : first, a trace-preserving
quantum map E is applied to ρAB that takes care of the
announcement and discarding. The Kraus operators of
the map are given by FuA⊗FuB corresponding to the coin-
ciding announcements u. The filters are explicitly given
by FuA =
√∑
muA
Ax and F
u
B =
√∑
muB
By.
This map creates an ensemble {Fu[ρAB ], p(u)} of nor-
malized states
Fu[ρAB ] = FuA ⊗ FuBρAB(FuA ⊗ FuB)†/p˜(u), (13)
p˜(u) = tr{FuA ⊗ FuBρAB(FuA ⊗ FuB)†}, (14)
each with probability p(u) = p˜(u)pkept . The probability that
ρAB is kept in this process is pkept =
∑
u p˜(u).
In the second step, the states Fu[ρAB ] are measured
with respect to new measurements MuA⊗MuB conditioned
on u. The new POVMs MuA and M
u
B are found by renor-
malizing the sets muA and m
u
B by the pseudo-inverses of
the filters defined on the non-zero subspace of FuA ⊗ FuB .
This ensures that measuring Fu[ρAB ] with respect to
MuA ⊗MuB yields the same outcomes as measuring ρAB
with respect to MA ⊗MB :
MuA = {(FuA)−1Ax(Fu†A )−1 : Ax ∈muA},
MuB = {(FuB)−1By(Fu†B )−1 : By ∈muB}. (15)
In [13], the key rate after post-selection (r¯) extracted
from each coinciding announcement u independently is
given by
r¯(E(ρAB)) = I¯obs − χ¯(E(ρAB)), (16)
with the following definition of the overall Holevo quan-
tity
χ¯(E(ρAB)) :=
∑
u
p(u)χ(Fu[ρAB ],MuA). (17)
The overall mutual information I¯obs is the mutual infor-
mation of Alice and Bob’s data after postselection. It is
fixed by the measurement outcomes p(x, y).
6C. Description of Eve’s optimal attack
Typically, the state |Ψ〉 is not completely know to Al-
ice and Bob. They might hold only partial information
about |Ψ〉 via the characterization of the set Γ in the
parameter estimation step. If this is the case, Alice and
Bob must assume that Eve chose the most powerful at-
tack (optimal attack) compatible with Γ, which is the
attack that yields the lowest key rate
rmin = min
ρAB∈Γ
r¯(E(ρAB))
= I¯obs − max
ρAB∈Γ
χ¯(E(ρAB)). (18)
While the first term (I¯obs) is fixed by Alice and Bob’s
measurement outcomes p(x, y), the second term (χ¯) is
obtained through optimization over all possible attacks.
VI. SYMMETRIES IN PROTOCOLS
In this section we describe a scenario in which we can
show that the optimal attack carries a certain symmetry
without loss of generality. Under the assumption that
Alice and Bob use a coarse-grained version of the exact
probability distribution p(x, y) for the parameter estima-
tion, and if the overall Holevo quantity χ¯ satisfies certain
symmetry properties, it can be shown that the optimal
attack lies within a symmetric set. The symmetry prop-
erty of the optimal attack is useful in the optimization of
the key rate in Eq. (18). For a detailed analysis see Ref.
[13].
First, let us define the symmetries of the POVMs MA
and MB . Let G be a symmetry group with group ele-
ments g and a unitary representation Ug on the Hilbert
space HS . A set S containing operators on HS is called
G-invariant, if for all elements sx ∈ S and all Ug ∈ G it
holds that UgsxU
†
g := sg(x) ∈ S.
Suppose our protocol is equipped with POVMs MA
and MB that exhibit the following G-invariance
U∗gAxU
T
g =: Ag(x) ∈MA, (19)
UgByU
†
g =: Bg(y) ∈MB . (20)
Consider now a state
Ug[ρAB ] = U∗g ⊗ UgρABUTg ⊗ U†g , (21)
which is unitarily equivalent under the symmetry group
to ρAB . If we measure Ug[ρAB ] with respect to MA⊗MB ,
the resulting probability distribution, pg(x, y), of the
measurement outcomes is, by virtue of the G-invariance,
a permuted version of p(x, y). Furthermore, if ρA =
U∗g ρAUg, the reduced density matrix of Ug[ρAB ] is un-
changed.
In the parameter estimation Alice and Bob are free to
use a coarse-grained version Q[{p(x, y)}] of the detailed
probability distribution p(x, y). In fact, in many cases,
only averaged observations, like the average quantum bit
error rate, are used for this task. The averaged observa-
tions that we choose to use in our protocol are invariant
under permutation of the p(x, y), in the sense that
Q[{p(x, y)}] = Q[{pg(x, y)}]. (22)
In this scenario, all states Ug[ρAB ] are compatible with Q,
whenever ρAB was compatible with Q. If Q is also linear
in p(x, y), we can also include the convex combination
ρ¯AB =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
Ug[ρAB ] (23)
to the set of compatible states. Here, |G| is the cardinal-
ity of the group G. Consequently, we define the new set
Γave, containing all density operators which are compati-
ble with Q and ρA. The new set Γave is a superset of the
original set Γ.
As shown in [13], if the Holevo quantity is concave in
ρAB and satisfies the equivalence property, χ¯(E(ρAB)) =
χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB ])), the quantity χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)) calculated from
the symmetrized state ρ¯AB always upper bounds the
quantity χ¯(E(ρAB)) calculated from ρAB ∈ Γave. There-
fore, without loss of generality, the optimal attack is
found in a set Γ¯ defined as follows:
Definition 2 The set Γ¯ contains all bipartite sym-
metrized states ρ¯AB that are compatible with Q and that
have a given reduced state ρA.
We then obtain the key rate:
rmin = I¯ − max
ρ¯AB∈Γ¯
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)). (24)
VII. CONVEXITY AND EQUIVALENCE
PROPERTY OF χ¯ IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE
UNBALANCED PHASE-ENCODED PROTOCOL
In this section we show the concavity and equiva-
lence property of χ¯ in the case of the unbalanced phase-
encoded protocol. We then compute the key rate in the
scenario with the coarse-grained parameter estimation.
A. Postselection
In the sifting process Alice and Bob postselect on
events in the same basis (“odd” or “even”) in the middle
time slot. We first calculate Alice’s filters for this posts-
election from the “odd” and “even” POVM elements in
Eq. (4):
FA := F
odd
A = F
even
A = 1/
√
2. (25)
The new renormalized POMV measurements MuA condi-
tioned on u are related to the original POVM elements
7in muA simply by a factor 2:
MevenA = {2A0, 2A2},
ModdA = {2A1, 2A3}. (26)
We also calculate Bob’s filters from the “odd” and “even”
POVM elements in Eq. (5). There is a dependence on ξ
in Bob’s filter, but again the filters are equal for “even”
and “odd” bases
FB := F
even
B = F
odd
B =
1√
2
( √
1− ξ 0
0
√
ξ
)
. (27)
Here the filters are presented in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}. It is
straightforward to find Bob’s post-selected POVMs
MevenB = {2B′0, 2B′2},
ModdB = {2B′1, 2B′3}, (28)
expressed in terms of the BB84-type measurements B′y
in Eq. (6).
B. Symmetries
The symmetry group G governing the POVMs Ax and
By is the cyclic group C4 with 4 elements. A reducible
representation of C4 in the canonical basis of the signal
states is given by
Ug =
(
1 0
0 eigpi/2
)
g ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. (29)
Alice and Bob’s POVMs satisfy the symmetry relation
U∗gAxU
T
g = Ax+g and UgByU
†
g = By+g where addition is
taken modulo 4, while the outside element Bout and the
reduced density matrix ρA in Eq. (3) remain invariant
under the action of Ug. Note that complex conjugation
and Hermitian conjugation are equivalent operations for
all unitaries Ug, because they are simultaneously diago-
nal.
Not only are the POVMs MA and MB C4-invariant,
but also the post-selected POVMs satisfy a certain sym-
metry relation with respect to C4. Let us define the ac-
tion of a unitary U on a POVM M = {Kx} by
UMU† := {UKxU†} (30)
The C4-invariance of the sets of POVMs M
u
A and M
u
B is
given by
U∗gM
u
AU
T
g = M
g(u)
A ,
UgM
u
BU
†
g = M
g(u)
B . (31)
For this particular example, g(u) = u ⊕ parity(g) with
parity(g) ∈ {even, odd}. The addition is defined by the
rules: even⊕ even = odd⊕odd = even and odd⊕ even =
even⊕ odd = odd.
C. Concavity and equivalence property of χ¯
From the property that the filters are equal for “even”
and “odd” announcements in Eqs. (25, 27), we can derive
the relationship between “even” and “odd” normaliza-
tion p˜(odd) = p˜(even) =: p˜ and the postselected density
matrices:
F [ρAB ] := Feven[ρAB ] = Fodd[ρAB ]. (32)
While p˜(u) depends on the density matrix ρAB , the nor-
malized probability distribution p(u) does not: p(odd) =
p(even) = 12 . Furthermore, the filters commute with all
unitaries Ug for Alice and Bob:
[FK , Ug] = 0 ∀g ∈ G, K ∈ {A,B}. (33)
Consequently, F in Eq. (32) commutes with the symme-
try group
F [Ug[ρAB ]] = Ug[F [ρAB ]]. (34)
Moreover, F acts linearly on any convex combination
of states of the form Ug[ρAB ], for example on the sym-
metrized state ρ¯AB
F [ρ¯AB ] = 1|G|
∑
g
F [Ug[ρAB ]]. (35)
We have now all ingredients to show the concavity and
the equivalence property of χ¯. Consider three density
matrices ρAB , σAB and the convex combination ρ¯AB =
λρAB+(1−λ)σAB with λ ∈ [0, 1]. In Ref. [13] it is shown
that the quantity χ(ρAB ,MA) is concave with respect to
ρAB , namely:
χ(ρ¯AB ,MA) ≥ λχ(ρAB ,MA) + (1− λ)χ(σAB ,MA).
(36)
Using Eq. (35) and (36), the concavity of χ¯ follows:
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = 1
2
∑
u
χ (F [ρ¯AB ],MuA)
≥ 1
2
∑
u
1
|G|
∑
g
χ (F [Ug[ρAB ]],MuA) (37)
=
1
|G|
∑
g
χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB ]).
For the equivalence property we resort to lemma 1 in
[13] that describes the invariance property of the Holevo
quantity under unitary transformation
χ(Ug[ρAB ],MA) = χ(ρAB , UTg MAU∗g ). (38)
This property also holds for the postselected states due to
the commutation rule in Eq. (34) and the G-invariance
of the MuA in Eq. (31)
χ
(
F [Ug[ρAB ]],Mg(u)A
)
= χ (F [ρAB ],MuA) . (39)
8The equivalence transfers to χ¯ by means of Eqs. (39) and
(32):
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = 1
2
∑
u
χ(F [ρAB ],MuA)
=
1
2
∑
u
χ(F [Ug[ρAB ]],Mg(u)A ) (40)
=
1
2
∑
g(u)
χ(F [Ug[ρAB ]],MuA) = χ¯(E(Ug[ρAB ])).
Having showed concavity and equivalence, we can as-
sume without loss of generality that the optimal attack
is chosen from the set Γ¯. The two main properties used
to prove the equivalence and concavity were essentially
Eqs. (25, 27) and (33).
VIII. KEY RATES IN THE QUBIT-TO-QUBIT
SCENARIO
We now calculate the key rate of the unbalanced phase-
encoded protocol in the qubit-to-qubit scenario. We as-
sume that Alice and Bob perform the parameter estima-
tion based on the average error rate
Q =
p(0, 2) + p(2, 0) + p(1, 3) + p(3, 1)
2p˜
, (41)
which is calculated from the detailed probability distri-
bution p(x, y) and the normalization p˜ in Eq. (14). The
average error rate satisfies the property (22), which fol-
lows from the G-invariance of MuA and M
u
B in Eq.(31).
The symmetric state ρ¯AB with respect to the C4 sym-
metry group is generally described by the density matrix
ρ¯AB =
 a f
∗
b
c
f d
 (42)
with open parameters a, b, c, d and f that satisfy
the trace conditions tr ρ¯AB = 1. The matrix repre-
sentation of ρ¯AB is with respect to the canonical basis
{|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}. The reduced density matrix
trB(ρ¯AB) =
(
a+ b
c+ d
)
(43)
is fixed by ρA (see Eq. (3)), which leads to the additional
constraint a+b = ξ on the parameters. Furthermore, the
error rate constraint
Q =
p˜− 12<[f ]
√
ξ(1− ξ)
2p˜
(44)
eliminates another parameter. The normalization p˜ is
given by p˜ = 14 ((1−ξ)(a+c)+ξ(b+d)) and <[f ] denotes
the real part of f .
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FIG. 7: Key rates per postselected signal in the middle time
slot for unbalanced phase-encoded protocol in dependence on
the error rate Q for different values of κ in the phase modu-
lator.
We calculate the Holevo quantity χ¯ and use MATLAB
calling the optimization function fmincon to perform a
numerical optimization over the states ρ¯AB ∈ Γ¯. To sim-
ulate the classical data used for the calculation of the
mutual information, we assume a typical scenario with
symmetric observations. The mutual information is then
a function of the average error rate I¯obs = 1−h(Q), with
h denoting the binary entropy.
In Fig.7 we show a plot of the key rates renormal-
ized on matching bases and clicks in the middle time slot
for different values of κ in the case of a lossless chan-
nel. In particular, observe that as κ increases, the key
rate increases as well. This behavior originates from the
signal state structure: as the signals become more non-
orthogonal with increasing κ, the eavesdropper has more
difficulty to distinguish them. This advantage disappears
quickly, though, once loss is added to the channel. For
a fair comparison of the protocol performances, however,
we must analyze the protocols under a realistic channel
model.
IX. CONCAVITY AND EQUIVALENCE IN THE
CASE OF THE PBS PROTOCOL
The PBS protocol differs from the unbalanced phase-
encoded protocol only in the measurements on Bob’s side.
Bob’s filters for the PBS protocol,
FB′ := F
even
B′ = F
odd
B′ = 1/
√
2 (45)
also satisfy the properties in Eqs. (25, 27) and (33). As
these were the two properties needed to show concavity
and equivalence of χ¯, we can again assume a symmetric
optimal attack of the form (42).
9X. KEY RATES FOR REALISTIC DEVICES
The security proof in section VIII is tailored to the
situation where Alice and Bob use perfect qubits (e.g.
single photons). The actual experimental implementa-
tions, however, are performed with optical modes in an
infinite dimensional Hilbert space. In particular, Alice’s
device can send vacuum and multi-photons into the chan-
nel, and Bob’s detector can receive vacuum and multi-
photons from the channel. In order to achieve a complete
security proof, we need to include the deviation from the
ideal qubit-to-qubit scenario.
Recently, several powerful tools [5, 6, 8, 10–12] have
been developed to bridge the gap between theory and
experiment, with the aim to extend the validity of qubit-
based security proofs to the more realistic scenario of
optical modes. On Alice’s side, the multi-photon com-
ponents are taken care of by using decoy states [8], sup-
ported by tagging [5, 6]. This essentially permits to es-
timate the fraction of the single photon contributions in
the data. On the other hand, the multi-photons entering
Bob’s detector are taken care of by the squashing method
in Refs. [10–12]. If a squashing map exists for a certain
measurement setup, then the detection pattern resulting
from an arbitrary input state into Bob’s detector can be
interpreted as if it were coming from a single photon or
a vacuum input.
Note that this approach gives a provable secure key
rate, however, higher key rates may be achievable with a
refined analysis. The starting point for the refined anal-
ysis is the observation that a photon number splinting
attack on multi-photon signals does not leak the signal
content with certainty to Eve, even after the basis an-
nouncement. However, such an analysis will be rather
involved. It is expected that for strong asymmetries in
the balancing the refined analysis would improve the re-
sults significantly, as the scheme then takes a similar form
as the strong reference pulse schemes analyzed in [14, 15].
A. Key rate for unbalanced phase-encoded
protocol with realistic devices
For the unbalanced phase-encoded detector setup, a
valid squashing map has been proven to exist in Ref. [12].
A schematic of the squashing idea is shown in Fig. 8. In
the proof it is assumed that Bob’s detectors can resolve
the three different time slots. Therefore, a general incom-
ing optical mode can trigger any possible click pattern
in the 6 detection slots. A POVM is associated to this
measurement, called the basic POVM. Through classical
post-processing, described in more detail below, several
basic POVM elements are combined to form the effective
(single-click) POVM elements. The effective POVM has
5 elements {Beff0 , Beff1 , Beff2 , Beff3 , Beffout}, which reflect the
single-click structure of the target qubit POVMs given in
Eq. (5). The squashing map in Ref. [12] then maps the
effective POVM to the target POVM.
Basic 
POVM
Post-
processing
Effective POVM
Target 
POVM
Squashing
+
⇔
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FIG. 8: The basic POVM combined with classical post-
processing forms the effective POVM, which is mapped to
the target (qubit) POVM by the squashing map.
TABLE I: Mapping of the basic POVM to the effective
POVM via probabilistic classical post-processing.
Basic Effective Probability
POVM POVM
Single-click Single-click 1
Double-click (middle) “even”
Beff0 0.5
Beff2 0.5
Double-click (middle) “odd”
Beff1 0.5
Beff3 0.5
Multi-click (outside only) Beffout 1
Cross-click
Beff0 0.125
Beff1 0.125
Beff2 0.125
Beff3 0.125
Beffout 0.5
The post-processing in Ref. [12] that maps the basic
POVM to the effective POVM is shown in Table I. In
order to maintain the statistics for an incoming single
photon, any single-click basic POVM element is mapped
to the corresponding effective POVM element. Further-
more, the basic multi-click POVM elements are processed
as follows: double-click POVM elements in the “even”
(“odd”) basis in the middle time slot are mapped with
equal probability to Beff0 or B
eff
2 (B
eff
1 or B
eff
3 ); outside
multi-click POVM elements are always mapped to the
outside POVM element Beffout; cross-click POVM elements
(simultaneous middle and outside clicks) are probabilisti-
cally mapped with probability 0.5 to Beffout and with prob-
ability 0.125 to each of the four Beffy , y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. This
post-processing essentially maps double-clicks to errors in
the data.
Due to the existence of the squashing map, we can
assume that all detection events on Bob’s side are single-
photon events, whereas Alice’s source can either send a
vacuum signal (v), a single-photon (s) or multi-photons
(m).
In the error correction step, Alice and Bob must correct
all errors in their data. Therefore, the error correction
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term, which is the mutual information, depends on the
total observed error rate Qtot: I¯obs = 1−h(Qtot). Due to
the decoy states and the tagging method, however, the
privacy amplification term, which is the Holevo quan-
tity, splits into the individual contributions from vacuum,
single-photon or multi-photon signals (χ¯v, χ¯s and χ¯m).
Let us define by pmid(a) the probability that the signal
a ∈ {v, s,m} sent by Alice produced a click in a middle
time slot in Bob’s detector, and the total probability of
a middle click by pmid =
∑
a∈{v,s,m} pmid(a). Then the
total key rate is given by
R =
1
2
pmidI¯obs − ∑
a∈{v,s,m}
pmid(a) χ¯a
 . (46)
A factor 1/2 was introduced for the sifting.
Typically, we assume that Eve has full knowledge
about the vacuum and the multi-photon signals (tag-
ging), therefore χ¯v = χ¯m = 1. Only the term χ¯s enters
the optimization. Due to the decoy and tagging meth-
ods, Alice and Bob have an estimate of the error rate
within the single photon events (q). The error rate q is
the quantity appearing in the optimization and is gener-
ally different from Qtot.
When we are no longer dealing with the strict qubit-
to-qubit scenario, we must make some modifications to
the constraint on ρA in order to adapt to the realistic sce-
nario. We can no longer use the full information ρA in
Eq. (3) to constrain the reduced density matrix trB(ρ¯AB)
in Eq. (43). Recall that the fixed reduced density ma-
trix ρA describes the reduced density matrix of all single
photons exiting the source. These photons are lost in the
channel with probability plost, and arrive in Bob’s detec-
tor with probability 1−plost. The reduced density matrix
ρA of the total photons is conserved in this process
ρA = (1− plost) trB(ρ¯AB) + plostρlostA , (47)
where ρlostA is an unknown density matrix corresponding
to the lost photons. We use this weaker version to con-
strain trB(ρ¯AB) in the optimization of the Holevo quan-
tity χ¯s.
We optimize the Holevo quantity χ¯s over the set of
symmetric states ρ¯AB (Eq. (42)) with the error rate con-
strain q and the relaxed constraint in Eq. (47) on the re-
duced density matrix. The dependence of the optimized
Holevo quantity on q, plost and κ is denoted in square
brackets χ¯maxs [q, plost, κ]. The total optimized key rate
for the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol is then given
by
R =
1
2
(
− pmidh(Qtot) + pmid(s)(1− χ¯maxs [q, plost, κ])
)
.
(48)
In Figs. 9 and 10 we plot the key rates of the unbal-
anced phase-encoded protocol and the hardware fixes for
different values of κ. We simulate a channel using the
distance [km]
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10
!7
10
!6
10
!5
10
!4
10
!3
10
!2
k
e
y
 r
a
te
 p
e
r 
c
lo
c
k
 c
y
c
le
e) d) c) b)
a)
Thursday, May 17, 2012
FIG. 9: (color online) Plot of the key rates in the realis-
tic scenario. a) Key rate of the PBS protocol with no loss
(dashed blue line). b) Key rate of the PBS protocol with
κ = 0.5 (dashed red line). c) Key rate of the unbalanced
phase-encoded protocol with no loss (κ = 1) (solid blue line).
d) Key rate of the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol with
κ = 0.5 (solid red line) coinciding with the key rate of the
hardware fix with an uneven beamsplitter (black circles). e)
Key rate of the hardware fix with additional loss in the short
arm (black line).
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10
!7
10
!6
10
!5
10
!4
10
!3
10
!2
distance [km]
k
e
y
 r
a
te
 p
e
r 
c
lo
c
k
 c
y
c
le
κ = 1
0.5
0.7
0.3
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
FIG. 10: (color online) Plot of the key rates of the unbal-
anced phase-encoded protocol for different values of κ.
experimental values in Ref. [16] for channel loss, dark
counts, detector efficiency and error correction efficiency,
and assume that no double clicks were observed. We
also optimize over the mean photon number of the signal
pulses leaving Alice.
Generally, the loss in the phase modulator decreases
the key rate of the protocols. The performance of the un-
balanced phase-encoded protocol coincides exactly with
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the performance of the hardware fix with an uneven
beamsplitter, providing a choice between the hardware
fix (requiring a special unsymmetrical beam splitter), and
the improved theory solution presented here. Both of
these scenarios, however, outperform the second hard-
ware fix with an additional loss in the short arm.
B. Key rate for PBS protocol with realistic devices
For the PBS protocol detector setup the squashing map
is shown to exist in Refs. [10, 11]. Since all pulses inter-
fere, we can drop the specification on middle clicks in the
key rate. We call the probability that Alice sent a sin-
gle photon and Bob detected it by pdet(s) and the total
detection probability pdet =
∑
a∈{v,s,m} pdet(a). The key
rate in the PBS scenario is then
R =
1
2
(
− pdeth(Qtot) + pdet(s)(1− χ¯maxs [q, plost, κ])
)
.
(49)
We plot the key rates of the PBS protocol in Fig. 9
for different values of κ. The key rates of the PBS pro-
tocol are higher than the key rates of the unbalanced
phase-encoded key for equal loss in the phase modulator,
because no signal is lost due to outside clicks. Neverthe-
less, the loss in the phase modulator decreases the key
rates of the PBS protocol.
XI. CONCLUSION
We analyze the security of the phase-encoded BB84
protocol with a lossy phase modulator in one arm of the
Mach-Zehnder interferometer. We consider two proto-
cols, the unbalanced phase-encoded and the PBS proto-
col. We provide a qubit-based security proof, which we
embed in the more general framework of optical modes
using the decoy states method, tagging and squashing.
In general, it turns out that the proven secure key rates
are lowered by the unbalanced loss in the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer, so that a performance evaluation based
on the security analysis of the standard BB84 proto-
col with laser pulses should not be used. The imple-
mentation with additional polarization encoding of the
pulses (PBS protocol) performs better than the one with
no additional polarization encoding (unbalanced phase-
encoded protocol), because all signals forcedly interfere
in Bob’s interferometer. A comparison of the key rates of
the unbalanced phase-encoded protocol to the key rates
of the two suggested hardware fixes shows that an exper-
imental remedy is not necessary and does not contribute
to an improvement of the key rate.
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